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the crowing Cockrell helpes his Hen to defend her Chickens from perill, and will 
indanger himselfe to save her and them from harme. Seeing then that these 
unreasonable creatures, by the instinct of nature, beare such affection each to other, 
that without any grudge, they willingly, according to their kind, helpe one another, I 
may reason Ã  minore ad maius, that much more should man and woman, which are 
reasonable creatures, be helpers each to other in all things lawfull1    
So Rachel Speght defends marriage against the ‘woman-hater’, Joseph Swetnam. Speght 
assumes the affections of beasts as a simple starting point to argue from a small example of 
action to what ought to be the case in marriage; animal affection stands as a certainty 
beside debated human love. Yet what writing on general cultural matters takes for granted 
– that animals have affection, communication and, implicitly, love, some of the 
philosophical discourses of the seventeenth century spent much energy denying and 
unpicking.  How, then, can we consider ‘love’ in the relationships amongst humans and 
beasts in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Anglophone culture? 
 This posture considers the potential for the category of love to form a part of our 
understanding of the human-beast relationship. As a category, the relationships of ‘love’ 
that Speght’s allegory takes for granted were deeply contested within philosophical debates 
on the human – and for some animal affection disappeared alongside the contested 
categories of the soul, thought, reason and language.2 
   Animal-human relationships were central to the writing of Michel de Montaigne. 
Montaigne begins by considering the human animal’s pride ‘that he ascribeth divine 
conditions unto himselfe’, and challenges human insistence on separation from the animal 
to suggest ‘paraitie’:3 
How knoweth he by the vertue of his understanding the inward and secret motions 
of beasts? By what comparison from them to us doth he conclude the brutishness he 
ascribeth unto them?4 
Montaigne acknowledges the beast as having an unknowable interior, present in 
interactions with humans but out of their grasp. He goes further to imply that true 
comparison with regard to brutishness might yield the opposite answer from the human 
prejudice against the beast. He does not directly address the subject of love but, famously, 
of play asking, ‘[w]hen I am playing with my Cat, who knowes whether she have more 
sporte in dallying with me, than I have in gaming with hir? We entertaine one other with 
mutuall apish trickes.’5 Montaigne implies not only agency but reciprocity and potentially at 
least a current of mutual affection between human and cat. While eschewing the topic of 
love explicitly, he implies throughout that affection is bound up with relationships amongst 
companion species and does explicitly raise animal to animal ‘kindness’. Writing of the 
question of language, Montaigne argues that animals can communicate not only with their 
own kind, as cats with cats and so on, but ‘even of such as are of different kindes’.6 
However, it is not only if the animal can vocalise that it can communicate for ‘[ev]ven in 
beasts that have no voice at all, by the reciprocall kindnesse which we see in them’ we 
know that they can communicate. Crucially, he attributes to them ‘love’ and ‘friendship’.7 
Thus Montaigne proposes an animal richly capable of at least what was regarded in the 
Renaissance as  affection and love to each other.8 Montaigne appreciates animal 
companionship and implies that language in animal takes a form that indicates they have 
feelings for others. For contemporaries, Montaigne’s writing became a touchstone in 
claiming the animal as an affective participant. 
    René Descartes made language key to recognition of the human and denied it to beasts. 
In doing so, he also challenged Montaigne’s understanding of animals as feeling. He writes 
to a correspondent: 
As for brute animals, we are so used to believing that they have feelings like us that 
it is hard to rid ourselves of that opinion. Yet suppose we were equally used to 
seeing automatons which perfectly imitated every one of our actions that it is 
possible to imitate; suppose, further, that we never took them for more than 
automatons; in this case we should be in no doubt that all the animals which lack 
reason were automatons too.9 
In order to deny that an animal has feelings, Descartes here resorts to an elaborate analogy 
to defamiliarise the animal and establish a similarity with automata through the lack of 
reason. For Jacques Derrida, our impoverished conception of both human and animal others 
is a consequence of the making of this debased, Cartesian, animal-automaton.10 Moreover, 
as Erica Fudge notes, Christianity’s hierarchisation of humans and animals meant many 
writers in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England relied on the inferior status of 
animals to guarantee the ‘human’. 
     However, beyond philosophy lay a culture where not only did many humans closely co-
habit with animals but, for some, their status and success was bound up with animal well-
being.11 Sixteenth-century advice to  purchase alert cattle that ‘stare nat and that hee lycke’ 
themselves and the sheer number of horse-related workers in the Duke of Newcastle’s 
stables show us the detail with which humans related to livestock. 12 Moreover, Descartes’ 
very acknowledgement of the prevailing assumption that animals have ‘feelings’ invites us 
to look for love in other kinds of texts, like those of Speght. 
     Animal feelings are pervasive in Renaissance culture. In allegories and in imagining 
emotions as embodied, Renaissance writers and readers use animal-human hybrids (like 
the centaur) to express human states, implying an imaginary correlation of human and 
animal states.13 Mutual affection as well as civic and familial virtue is implied in the 
presence of canine companions in tomb monuments.14 Moreover, as Karen Raber also 
notes, such blending was given explicit connections to love, as in Sir Philip Sidney’s 
investigation of himself as love’s horse, in whose ‘Manage I do take delight.’15 
‘[C]herrishing’ words of reward to a horse spoken ‘smoothly and lovingly’ impart 
‘cheerfulnesse of spirit, and a knowledge that he hath done wel’, Gervase Makham tells us, 
implying intimacy, care and even love between beast and human. 16 
    The Renaissance, then, may not offer us many philosophical texts in which we can identify 
animals as having capacity to love and be loved. However, if we look beyond philosophy,  
many texts that sometimes directly, sometimes paradoxically, assume or imply what Martha 
Nussbaum calls the ‘capabilities’ of non-human animals to have ‘friendship and affiliation’ 
(and humans).17  
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